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INTRODUCTION
The growth of the patent system in the last quarter
of a century in this country has reached a stage in its
progress where the variety and magnitude of the
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interests involved require accuracy, precision, and
care in the preparation of all the papers on which
the patent is founded. . . . The developed and
improved condition of the patent law, and of the
principles which govern the exclusive rights
conferred by it, leave no excuse for ambiguous
language or vague descriptions. . . . It seems to us
that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the
patentee and to the public, than that the former
should understand, and correctly describe, just what
he has invented, and for what he claims a patent.1
Imagine you are Elwood Haynes, the inventor of the first true
American automobile in 1894.2 Being the first American to invent
an automobile designed to run entirely on its own power, you
quickly make plans to build a factory in Kokomo, Indiana to ramp
up production. You would be shocked, therefore, to learn that
George Selden, a patent attorney from Rochester, NY, had already
obtained a patent filed in 1879 not just for an internal combustion
engine, but for its use on four-wheeled vehicles as well.3 To make
matters worse, George Selden was going around to every
American car manufacturer and demanding that they pay a royalty
to his patent or else meet him in the court room.4 Although a
group of car manufacturers, including Henry Ford, eventually
stood up to Selden in court and won a judgment of noninfringement of Selden’s patent,5 it is still amazing to consider the
deterrent effect of Selden’s conduct on automobile innovation.6
1

Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1876).
See W.C. MADDEN, HAYNES-APPERSON AND AMERICA’S FIRST PRACTICAL
AUTOMOBILE: A HISTORY 3 (McFarland & Co. Inc., 2003).
3
See U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (filed May 8, 1879) (issued Nov. 5, 1895).
4
See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 889 (1990).
5
See Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C.A. Durer & Co., 184 F. 893, 915 (2d Cir. 1911).
6
See Merges & Nelson supra note 4, at 890 (“Law suits based on [Selden’s patent]
surely did absorb considerable time and attention of people like Henry Ford, whose
production methods revolutionized the industry. Perhaps more importantly smaller firms
may have been put off by the threat of suit. At this early stage in the history of the
technology, those that left the industry or chose not to enter may well have taken valuable
improvements with them.”); see also Columbia Motor Car Co., 184 F. at 895 (“While he
withheld his patent, the public learned from independent inventors all that it could teach.
For the monopoly granted by his patent he had nothing to offer in return.”).
2
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Indeed, Selden could be described as an overreaching inventor,
who thought up an improvement to a one-cylinder engine and later
obtained a patent to all uses of an internal combustion engine for
use in an automobile. In the words of the court: “[t]he public
gained absolutely nothing from his invention, whatever it was.
From the point of view of public interest it were [sic] even better
that the patent had never been granted.”7
To those unfamiliar with patent law, it may come as a surprise
that an inventor can file for a patent without actually making the
thing he alleges to have invented. However, to the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), filing a patent
application is as good as actually constructing the invention in real
life.8 That being so, what ensures that a patentee does not obtain a
patent to something he has not really invented? The answer is
primarily two doctrines, both contained within 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶
1.9 The first is the “written description” requirement and the
second is the “enablement” requirement. These doctrines work
together to ensure that when the United States Patent and
Trademark Office grants a patent to an inventor, the public gets
something in return.10
On August 21, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit granted Ariad Pharmaceuticals’ petition for rehearing en
banc and requested briefs addressing: 1) “[w]hether 35 U.S.C. §
112, [¶] 1, contains a written description requirement separate from
an enablement requirement;”11 and 2) if so, “what is the scope and

7

Columbia Motor Car Co., 184 F. at 895.
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2138.05 (8th ed. 2008).
9
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
10
See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
11
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(granting the petition for rehearing en banc).
8
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purpose of the requirement?”12 In considering these issues, the
Federal Circuit reexamined a doctrine that traced its origins back to
at least the Patent Act of 1793.13 In the decade leading up to Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,14 a number of judges on
the Federal Circuit had begun to question the existence and scope
of the written description requirement in their dissents.15 By
accepting the en banc petition, the court decided that now was the
proper time to resolve these questions. On March 22, 2010, the
court finally answered the questions: “[w]e now reaffirm that §
112, first paragraph, contains a written description requirement
separate from enablement” and “[t]hat the adequacy of the
[written] description of the manner and process of making and
using the invention is judged by whether that description enables
one skilled in the art to make and use the same . . . .”16
Writing for the majority in Ariad, Judge Lourie explained that
the written description requirement ensures that the public gets its
fair share of the bargain when an inventor is granted a patent and
serves a related yet distinct purpose from the undisputed
enablement requirement:17 it ensures that the inventor actually
invented the subject matter claimed by his or her patent.18 This
Article argues that in so holding the Ariad court properly resolved
this dispute. Part I of this Article will first discuss the simplified
12

Id.
See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
14
598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
15
See, e.g., id. at 1361–62 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing
Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc); id. at 1325 (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc);
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 987 (Linn, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
16
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340, 1344.
17
See id. at 1345 (“[A] separate requirement to describe one's invention is basic to
patent law. Every patent must describe an invention. It is part of the quid pro quo of a
patent; one describes an invention, and, if the law’s other requirements are met, one
obtains a patent. The specification must then, of course, describe how to make and use
the invention (i.e., enable it), but that is a different task.”).
18
See id. at 1351 (“[T]he specification must describe an invention understandable to
that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”).
13
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facts of Ariad. Part I will then discuss the role of the enablement
and the written description requirements in the United States
Patent System and trace the historical development of the written
description requirement from the early Supreme Court decisions up
through the modern day Federal Circuit decisions. Part II will
discuss the three main viewpoints of the Federal Circuit on written
description as represented by Chief Judge Rader,19 Judge Lourie,
and Judge Linn. Part III of this Article will first analyze the
historical purpose of the written description requirement and then
analyze some common misconceptions and mischaracterizations of
the written description requirement. Part III will then discuss some
common ground among the judges of the Federal Circuit. This
Article concludes with suggestions for the role the written
description requirement should play going forward.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Simplified Factual Background of Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Eli Lilly and Co.
The technology at issue in Ariad involves the discovery of a
molecule named NF-KB.20 This molecule is akin to an “allpurpose cellular paramedic.”21 When a cell in the body detects a
harmful presence, such as bacteria, NF-KB is “activated.”22 The
activated NF-KB travels to the nucleus of the cell, where it
attaches to its binding site in the DNA, and activates the
production of, among other things, certain cytokines.23 These
cytokines help the cell survive that harmful presence, but the
cytokines themselves can be toxic in excess.24 Once the original

19
Judge Rader assumed the duties of Chief Judge on June 1, 2010. Randall R. Rader,
Chief Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=132&Itemid=24 (last visited Dec. 17,
2010). For the sake of consistency this Article will refer to him as Chief Judge Rader
throughout.
20
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d en
banc, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
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harmful presence is eliminated, such as when the bacterial
infection is cured, NF-KB activity decreases and the cell returns to
its original state.25
The owners of U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (“the ’516 patent”)
identified NF-KB and its pathway for entering the nucleus and
activating the production of cytokines.26 As stated above,
excessive NF-KB activation can, in itself, result in heightened
toxicity to the cell if left unchecked. For this reason, the inventors
of the ’516 patent hypothesized that if NF-KB activation could be
reduced, it might be possible to reduce these toxic side effects.27
Based on this hypothesis, Ariad claimed three methods of reducing
NF-KB activation in the ’516 patent.28 In general, Ariad proposed
three hypothetical methods of reducing NF-KB activation by: 1)
holding NF-KB in an inactive state by introducing its natural
inhibitor; 2) having another molecule bind to the DNA in the place
where NF-KB would otherwise bind (a so-called “dominantly
interfering molecule”); and 3) using a decoy molecule to bind to
NF-KB itself.29 Upon analysis of the specification, however, the
patent application disclosed no working examples, let alone any
prophetic examples, of methods of actually reducing NF-KB
activity.30
In sum, Ariad’s invention was the identification of NF-KB and
its role in gene activation. Ariad hypothesized that if NF-KB
activation is reduced, some toxic symptoms associated with known
diseases could likewise be reduced. Ariad, however, did not
actually invent a way of reducing NF-KB activation. Rather, Ariad
hypothesized some probable ways to reduce NF-KB activation and
attempted to obtain a broad patent claiming any possible method of
suppressing NF-KB activation. The Federal Circuit found this was
“little more than a research plan” and “an attempt to preempt the
future before it has arrived.”31 Because the inventors did not
describe any method of reducing NF-KB activation, their patent
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 1369–70.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1374–75.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1373, 1376 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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was held invalid for failing to satisfy the written description
requirement under § 112.32 The Federal Circuit did not reach the
question of whether the patent fulfilled the enablement requirement
because it held that, even if one skilled in the art was enabled to
make the invention, “the scope of the right to exclude . . . does not
overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art
as described in the patent specification.”33 The court relied on the
written description doctrine to ensure that the scope of the patent
was commensurate with Ariad’s discovery and cautioned Ariad to
be careful in what it asked for from the USPTO.34
B. Brief Overview of the United States Patent System
Before tracing the case development of the written description
requirement, this Section will briefly discuss some fundamental
aspects of the United States patent system. The ultimate goal of
the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the
public domain through disclosure.35 The exclusive rights granted
by a patent are the carrots enticing inventors to make their
invention known to the public. Before an inventor can obtain a
patent, the USPTO must first examine the patent application to
determine whether it satisfies the statutory requirements by
“drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are
not.”36 The core requirements of patent eligibility are that the
invention must be useful, novel, and non-obvious.37
Once the Patent Office has determined that the invention is
useful, novel, and non-obvious, an inventor must still satisfy
additional requirements. Several of these additional requirements

32

Id. at 1376–77.
Id. at 1371 (quoting Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
34
See id. at 1377 (“The motto, beware of what one asks for, might be applicable here.”
(quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
35
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
(quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933)).
36
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148 (quoting 13 THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Memorial ed. 1904)).
37
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2006).
33
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are located within 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.38 These relate to how
detailed the inventor must be in his description of his own
invention. The patent applicant must
describe his invention so that others may construct
and use it after the expiration of the patent and []
inform the public during the life of the patent of the
limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be
known which features may be safely used or
manufactured without a license and which may
not.39
Section 112, ¶ 1 has been construed to contain three
requirements.40 At issue for purposes of this Article are two of the
three requirements, the enablement requirement and the written
description requirement.41
The enablement requirement and the written description
requirement, although commingled, are separate and distinct.42
The enablement requirement is satisfied when “the specification
disclosure as a whole is such as to enable one skilled in the art to
make and use the claimed invention . . . .”43 This requirement
forces the inventor to explain to the public how to make and use
his invention. On the other hand, the function of the written
description requirement “is broader than to merely explain how to
‘make and use’ [the invention]; the applicant must also convey
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art, as of the filing
date sought, that he or she was in possession of the invention.”44
This requirement forces the inventor to describe his invention in
sufficient detail that the public understands his invention and
38

Id. § 112.
Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938) (quoting
Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40
35 U.S.C. § 112 (outlining a “written description” requirement, an enablement
requirement, and a “best mode” requirement).
41
See, e.g., In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 591 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
42
See id. at 594 (Rich, J., concurring) (stating that the written description and
enablement requirements are “distinct though commingled”).
43
In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
44
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also In re
Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The function of the description
requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the
application relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him . . . .”).
39
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recognizes the inventor’s contribution, and ensures that the
inventor was truly in possession of the invention at the time he
filed his patent application.
In summary, written description and enablement are part of the
§ 112 disclosure requirements.45 These disclosure requirements
ensure that the public gets a reciprocal benefit in exchange for
granting the inventor the exclusive patent rights.46
In exchange for all the detailed information about the
invention, the patent office and the inventor work together to draft
claims covering the scope of the new invention. Each sentencelong claim gives the inventor the exclusive right to stop others
from making, using, or selling his invention within the United
States.47 It is these claims which define the outer bounds of the
inventor’s exclusive patent rights.48
C. Historical Development of the Written Description
Requirement
This Section will now trace the development of the written
description requirement from the early Supreme Court cases,
through the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals cases, through
the early years at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
1. Early Supreme Court: Reconciling Written Description
with Claims
The first case applying a written description requirement is
Evans v. Eaton.49 In Evans, the Supreme Court found a “written
description” requirement in the Patent Act of 179350 and
invalidated the inventor’s patent for failure to satisfy this
requirement, even though his invention was sufficiently enabled.51
Thus, while the inventor explained how to make and use his
invention, his written description of that invention was deemed
45

35 U.S.C. § 112.
See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1876).
47
See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
48
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
49
20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
50
Id. at 433; see also Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
51
Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 434–35.
46
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deficient. The purpose of the written description requirement, the
Court explained, was to protect the public from the fear that an
inventor may “pretend[] that his invention is more than what it
really is.”52
At the time of Evans, United States patent law did not require
patents to have claims. Patent claims were first required with the
Patent Act of 1836 and their use continues to this day.53 A patent
claim is a one-sentence description of an embodiment of the
invention. While other parts of a patent application describe how
to make and use the invention, the patent claims define the precise
boundaries between what the inventor regards to be his invention
and what he does not. Patent claims serve the public notice
function of patent law by delineating the scope of the invention
contained within the patent and defining the dividing line between
infringing conduct and non-infringing conduct. When a patent
applicant prosecutes a patent at the USPTO, the primary focus of
the back-and-forth between the inventor and the USPTO regards
the precise drafting of patent claims. A patent applicant files
original claims and the USPTO, after searching the prior art, will
often reject those claims as being too broad and capturing subject
matter the patent applicant did not invent. At this point, the patent
applicant can either submit new claims or amend the original
claims to hew more closely to the line between his contribution
and what had been done before. The written description
requirement, separate and distinct from the enablement
requirement, survived the invention of claims, as evidenced in
O’Reilly v. Morse.54
In O’Reilly, after Samuel Morse invented the telegraph, he
attempted to claim the exclusive right not only to his own
invention, but to all devices using electricity to print characters at a
distance.55 This was, in fact, the scope of claim 8 of his patent.56
The Court held Morse’s claim 8 was “too broad, and not warranted

52

Id. at 434.
See Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117.
54
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854).
55
Id. at 112–13.
56
Id. at 111–12. Interestingly, this claim in his patent even survived a reissue at the
USPTO. Id.
53
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by law” because it was beyond the scope of his description.57
Morse had claimed “an exclusive right to use a manner and process
which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and
therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent.”58 Just
as the inventor of the first steam engine was not entitled to a patent
giving him the exclusive right to use steam as a motive power for
the purpose of propelling vessels, the Court reasoned, Morse was
not allowed to “shut[] the door against inventions of other persons”
in this area where it was not within his invention description.59
While the scope of Morse’s patent may have raised patentable
subject matter concerns, it was nonetheless rejected for exceeding
the scope of the invention described by Morse at the time of
filing.60
Following Morse, the Court continued to employ the written
description requirement as a basis to invalidate patents and patent
claims where the inventor had overreached beyond his true
invention.61
During the period from the late 1800s through the early 1900s,
it appears as though the Court was attempting to define the role of
the written description requirement in light of the relatively recent
addition of claims. Until this time, inventors were, perhaps
intentionally, accustomed to using ambiguous terms to specify
their inventions, and claims were added as an additional
requirement to circumscribe the invention at its broadest.62 In both
McClain v. Ortmayer63 and White v. Dunbar,64 for example, an
alleged infringer’s invention did not fall within the scope of the
patentee’s claims, yet the patentee sued, essentially arguing, “but
this falls within what I said in my specification.” In response, the
57

Id. at 113.
Id. (emphasis added).
59
Id. at 113.
60
Id. at 119–20.
61
See Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 56–57 (1938);
Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 55 (1931) (invalidating patent for an
apparatus for softening water for lack of written description); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94
U.S. 568, 572 (1876) (invalidating claim to deodorized heavy oils for lack of written
description).
62
Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573.
63
141 U.S. 419 (1891).
64
119 U.S. 47 (1886).
58
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Court consistently reiterated the theme that “[t]he claim is the
measure of [the patentee’s] right to relief, and while the
specification may be referred to[,] to limit the claim, it can never
be made available to expand it.”65 Thus, at a time when the United
States was among the first (if not the first) to require patent claims,
the Court emphasized that these claims had a purpose—that of
delimiting the “metes and bounds” of the invention so as to put the
public on notice of the maximum scope of the patent66—and made
clear that the written description in the specification could not be
relied upon to expand the patent scope beyond the claims.
2. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals: Adding Structure to
§ 112
The Court of Customs, initially formed in 1910, changed its
name to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) in
1929 and took on appeals from the United States Patent Office.67
Regarding patent appeals, these took the form of either ex parte
patent cases or inter partes interferences.68 Prior to the creation of
the CCPA, these appeals were handled by the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit.69 The Patent Act of 1952 enacted the current
version of 35 U.S.C. § 112 containing the “written description”
requirement, among others, within its first paragraph.70
In the cases following the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952,
the CCPA expressed frustration with the USPTO in many

65

McClain, 141 U.S. at 424.
See id.
67
Federal Judicial History: U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Successor to
the Court of Customs Appeals), 1910–1982, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/courts_special_cpa.html [hereinafter Federal Judicial History] (last
visited Oct. 21, 2010).
68
Ex parte actions are those cases between the patent applicant and the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office concerning whether the applicant is entitled to a patent. Inter partes
actions, on the other hand, are those cases between two patent applicants and the dispute
is over which applicant is entitled to the patent—essentially, which applicant invented the
invention first. See Federal Judicial History, supra note 67; see also Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
ip/boards/bpai/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
69
See Federal Judicial History, supra note 67.
70
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
66
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opinions.71 This frustration stemmed from the USPTO’s rejecting
patents under § 112 without specifying the particular deficiency
under § 112 and sometimes even mischaracterizing rejections
under § 112.72
The USPTO’s confusion should come as little surprise when §
112 contains six paragraphs, and Judge Rich himself noted that
several requirements exist within the first paragraph alone.73 Judge
Baldwin finally, in In re Moore,74 took it upon himself to reduce
confusion at the USPTO and “for the sake of completeness[,]” laid
out the requirements under the first and second paragraphs of §
112.75 Notably, Judge Baldwin expressed three requirements in
the first paragraph of § 112: 1) the description of the invention, 2)
enablement, and 3) best mode.76
From this point on, the written description requirement
continued to undergo case-by-case application and development.77
The majority of the cases involving § 112 written description at the
CCPA fell primarily into three categories: 1) interference
proceedings, where two inventors essentially try to prove who was

71
See In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (expressing frustration with
USPTO’s imprecise rejection under § 112); In re Robins, 429 F.2d 452, 456 n.5
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding “the examiner's Answer to be singularly unclear as to the
particular requirement or requirements of § 112 which were thought not to have been
met”); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding examiner took
improper approach to § 112, second paragraph rejection because the claims were more
properly rejected under § 112, first paragraph); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995–96
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (discussing examiner’s unclear basis for rejecting claims based on §
112); In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (finding USPTO “confuse[d]” when
best mode rejection was really an enablement rejection).
72
See Moore, 439 F.2d at 1232; Robins, 429 F.2d at 456 n.5; Borkowski, 422 F.2d at
909; Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995–96; Gay, 309 F.2d at 772.
73
Gay, 309 F.2d at 772 (noting that “two of the several requirements” exist in ¶ 1
alone).
74
439 F.2d at 1232.
75
Id. at 1235.
76
Id. at 1235–36.
77
See In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (finding § 112 is
properly used to reject a claim amended to recite elements that lack support in the
original disclosure); see also In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 825 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (reversing
USPTO’s rejection under § 102 on the grounds that applicant satisfied written description
requirement of § 112); In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (purportedly
resolving issue of whether “enablement” under § 112 is different from “written
description” under § 112).
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the first inventor;78 2) rejections during prosecution based upon
anticipation where the applicant attempts to rely on an earlier filing
to “swear behind” a cited reference;79 and, 3) rejections during
prosecution when later amendments were rejected for being unduly
broad.80
One of the more interesting cases during this time period is In
re Barker.81 At issue in Barker was whether the “enablement”
requirement is separate from the “written description”
requirement.82 While this case purports to resolve the issue, the
dividing lines quickly became apparent in this case, which
generated a total of three opinions. This is perhaps the first case on
record where the splintering of the court can be seen regarding the
issue of written description. Judge Miller, writing for the court,
traced the development of the written description doctrine through
the patent acts starting with the Patent Act of 1790 up through the
Patent Act of 1952.83 Judge Miller ultimately concluded that the
written description and enablement requirements are separate
because “[t]hat a person skilled in the art might realize from
reading the disclosure that such a step is possible is not a sufficient
indication to that person that that step is part of [a patentee’s]
invention.”84 Judge Rich, agreeing with the result, would have
resolved this case on application of § 132 and did not “subscribe to
[the majority’s] interpretation through assumptions based on
presumptions about the usage of superfluous words and the like.”85
Judge Rich, of course, had previously found a separate written
description requirement in In re Ruschig.86 Chief Judge Markey
dissented, arguing that the written description requirement “was

78

See, e.g., Fields v. Connover, 443 F.2d 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (considering which
party had priority over a patent relating to a chemical compound).
79
See, e.g., Koller, 613 F.2d at 821. An applicant “swears behind” a reference by
providing proof, along with a sworn affidavit, that the applicant conceived his invention
at a date prior to the date of the cited reference.
80
See, e.g., Rasmussen, 650 F.2d at 1215.
81
559 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
82
See id. at 591.
83
Id. at 592–93.
84
Id. at 593 (quoting In re Winkhaus, 527 F.2d 637, 640 (C.C.P.A. 1975)).
85
Id. at 594 (Rich, J., concurring) (noting that the new matter should be rejected solely
on the basis of its violation of § 132).
86
379 F.2d 990, 995–96 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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solely a judicial (and unnecessary) response to chemical cases in
which appellants were arguing that those skilled in the art ‘might’
make and use a claimed invention.”87
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals went a long way to
help clarify the law used daily by the USPTO in examining patent
applications. The court at various times recognized a written
description requirement separate and apart from the enablement
requirement.88 However, while a majority of the court seemed to
consider the issue resolved, the debate over the role of the written
description requirement between Judge Miller, Judge Rich, and
Chief Judge Markey in In re Barker foreshadowed the debate in
Ariad more than thirty years later.89
3. Early Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: How to
Apply Precedent From USPTO Appeals at CCPA to
Infringement Appeals from District Courts
In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
formed as a merger of the Court of Claims and the CCPA.90 The
Federal Circuit, in its first published opinion, adopted as binding
precedent all the prior decisions of both the Court of Claims and
the CCPA.91 The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit was also
expanded to include, among other things, appeals in patent cases
from the district courts. Thus, for the first time, there would be a
dedicated appellate court for hearing disputes between patentees
and alleged infringers. Some scholars feared that the Federal
Circuit would not benefit from the “percolation” that normally
occurs in the regional circuits.92 The law in general and the
87

Barker, 559 F.2d at 594 (Markey, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 593 (Rich, J., concurring); In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
89
Compare Barker, 559 F.2d at 593 with Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir 2010) (en banc).
90
Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982); see also
Federal Circuit Act of 1982, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/landmark_22.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
91
South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
92
See, e.g., Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745,
784 (1981) (noting that the efficiencies of a specialized patent court could “come at some
cost, for better results may come from the ‘confluence of doctrines’” associated with
courts of general jurisdiction hearing patent cases).
88
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Supreme Court specifically, benefit from analyzing the varying
approaches and rules of law among the regional circuits to decide
which should prevail. Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit,
the predecessor court would only have had occasion to apply the
written description requirement as a challenge to the validity of
originally filed claims if the issue had already been raised by the
USPTO in a rejection.93 Now, alleged infringers could raise the
issue of the failure to comply with the written description
requirement of § 112 as an affirmative defense to patent
infringement.94
The written description doctrine at the Federal Circuit got off
to a rocky start. In Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l Inc.,95 the
court stated “[t]he purpose of the [written] description requirement
. . . is to state what is needed to fulfil [sic] the enablement
requirement.”96 Notably, this is a position similar to the one Chief
Judge Rader, and others, take today.97 When read closely and in
context, however, the case did not hold that a separate written
description does not exist, but rather that “incorporation of the
requirements of section 112 into section 120 ensures that the
inventor had possession of [i.e., described] the later-claimed
invention on the filing date of the earlier application.”98 The court
in Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar,99 confirmed this aspect of the

93

See, e.g., In re Steinhauer, 410 F.2d 411, 412 (C.C.P.A. 1969). This is because
appeals from infringement suits at that time would have gone to the regional circuits.
Similar to the Federal Circuit’s present trademark jurisdiction, the CCPA could only hear
patent disputes between the patent applicant and the USPTO or priority disputes between
two patent applications. In the latter situation, issues involving “original claims” are
rarely at issue because in an interference proceeding, by definition, at least one applicant
has amended their claim to be identical to those of the other, and thus trigger the
interference.
94
See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
95
835 F.2d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
96
Id. at 1421.
97
See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting); id. at 1305 (Linn, J., dissenting).
98
Kennecott, 835 F.2d at 1421. 35 U.S.C. § 120 defines the requirements for when a
later-filed patent application may claim priority over an earlier-filed application. See 35
U.S.C. § 120 (2006).
99
935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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decision in Kennecott and sought to clear up any potential
confusion.100
In Vas-Cath, the USPTO rejected Mahurkar’s attempt to claim
priority back to the filing date of his previously filed design
patent.101 Mahurkar filed a design patent depicting his invention in
March of 1982.102 Subsequently, Mahurkar filed a utility patent in
1984 containing the same diagram of his invention that he included
with his design patent in 1982.103
Vas-Cath alleged that
Mahurkar’s patent, filed in 1984, was invalid because a Canadian
patent issued in August of 1982, anticipated Mahurkar’s patent.104
Mahurkar claimed he was the first inventor and as proof, pointed to
the filing of his design patent on March 1982, five months prior to
the Canadian patent.105 The district court held that the drawings in
the previously filed design patent did not satisfy the written
description requirement of § 112, which was required for
Mahurkar to claim priority of invention under § 120.106 The
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding finding that
drawings alone may satisfy the written description requirement of
§ 112.107 Mahurkar was entitled to claim he possessed the
invention at least as early as March 1982—before the Canadian
patent issued—because his pictures adequately described his
invention.108
Most interesting about the Vas-Cath opinion was Judge Rich’s
review of the case law development of the written description
requirement.109 Particularly, Judge Rich noted “some confusion”
100

Id. at 1563–64.
Id. at 1557. Because patentability often turns on who did something first, i.e., who
has “priority” of invention, applicants often try to prove they were first. A patent
applicant can claim priority back to an earlier-filed patent application, and hence be
treated as though the newer application were filed on the earlier date, only if the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120 are satisfied. See 35 U.S.C. § 120; see also supra note
98.
102
Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1557.
103
Id. at 1558–59.
104
See id. at 1558–59 (explaining that the Canadian patent asserted under § 102(b) was
actually filed by Mahurkar shortly after he filed his U.S. design patent).
105
Id. at 1559.
106
Id. at 1557.
107
Id. at 1565, 1567.
108
See id.
109
See id. at 1560–64.
101
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as to whether the written description requirement is separate and
distinct from the enablement requirement.110 To the extent
Kennecott suggested written description and enablement are the
same, Judge Rich simply disagreed and stated “we note that
decisions of a three-judge panel of this court cannot overturn prior
precedential decisions.”111 In conclusion, the court reaffirmed the
existence of a “written description requirement” in § 112 that is
separate and distinct from the enablement requirement.112
4. Recent Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
Entrenchment and Percolation
The development of the written description doctrine has been
complicated within the last ten years at the Federal Circuit. To be
sure, not a single majority opinion ever held that the requirement
simply did not exist.113 However, during this period, it became
very clear how certain judges felt about the written description
requirement. For example, Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (“Unocal”),114 foreshadowed the current dispute
between Judge Lourie and Chief Judge Rader over the written
description requirement. The patent at issue in Unocal was
directed towards automobile gasoline compositions that reduce

110

Id. at 1563.
Id. When the Federal Circuit was formed, it adopted as precedent all prior decisions
by the CCPA. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The Federal Circuit is therefore
bound both by its prior precedential decisions and prior CCPA decisions. Further, the
Federal Circuit can only overrule its own precedent (including binding CCPA decisions)
by sitting en banc. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563.
112
Id.
113
See In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The description
requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112 and is separate from the enablement requirement
of that provision.”); see also ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368,
1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Alonso, 545 F.3d 1015, 1019, 1021–22 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir.
2008); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968–69 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Gentry
Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fiers v. Revel,
984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
114
208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming the validity of a patent claiming
automotive gasoline compositions that reduce tailpipe emissions as against petroleum
refiners).
111

C03_SCHROEDER_010411_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

82

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

1/4/2011 6:08 PM

[Vol. 21:63

tailpipe emissions.115 At issue was whether the patent, which
described the invention in terms of ranges but otherwise failed to
describe the exact chemical component of each combination falling
within the disclosed ranges, satisfied the written description
requirement.116 In Unocal, Chief Judge Rader wrote for the court
affirming the validity of the patent-in-suit, on the grounds that it
satisfied the written description requirement under § 112.117 Judge
Lourie, in dissent, expressed his frustration that the majority was
conflating written description and enablement.118
The debate over the written description requirement continued
in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.119 In Enzo, the district
court first invalidated Enzo’s patent for failing to satisfy the
written description requirement of § 112.120 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of invalidity.121 Enzo
then requested a rehearing (panel and en banc) on the issue of
invalidity, and this time the Federal Circuit determined its prior
decision on written description was incorrect.122 The court
therefore vacated its prior panel decision, vacated the district
court’s grant of summary judgment finding the patent invalid for
failure to satisfy the § 112 written description requirement, and
denied the petition for en banc rehearing.123 Several opinions were
written for this case, and the positions of particular judges began to
solidify.124 The positions are discussed in detail in Part II below.
After Enzo, the views of certain judges became more
pronounced. For example, Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation,
Inc.,125 is signed “per curiam.” However, it is eerily reminiscent of
Chief Judge Rader’s view on written description, although it does
115

Id. at 991.
See id. at 997.
117
Id. at 1001.
118
See id. at 1002.
119
323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
120
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., No. 99-4548, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23791
at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2001).
121
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
122
Enzo, 323 F.3d at 960.
123
Id.
124
See id. at 971 (Lourie, J., concurring); id. at 975 (Newman, J., concurring); id. (Dyk,
J., concurring); id. at 976 (Rader, J., dissenting); id. at 987 (Linn, J., dissenting).
125
325 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
116
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not go as far as his earlier pronouncements.126 Chief Judge Rader
also wrote a concurring opinion in Moba further expressing his
view on written description, a position consistent with his earlier
opinion in Unocal and his later opinion in University of Rochester
v. G.D. Searle & Co.127
In Rochester,128 the viewpoints of particular judges became
apparent once again. Judge Lourie wrote the panel opinion
holding the University of Rochester’s patent invalid for failure to
comply with the written description requirement of § 112.129
Judge Lourie’s view on the law of written description was
consistent with his earlier position taken in Enzo and Unocal.130
The Federal Circuit later denied Rochester’s petition for en banc
rehearing, resulting in five separate judicial opinions.131
The confusion surrounding the role of the written description
requirement finally came to a head in the first Ariad decision. In
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,132 Judge Moore,
writing for the majority, found Ariad’s patent invalid for failure to
comply with the written description requirement.133 Judge Linn
wrote a concurrence, finding the written description aspect of the
decision supported by precedent, but expressing his view that a
separate written description requirement is misguided.134 The
court finally decided it was time to resolve the conflicts
surrounding the written description requirement and granted

126

See id. at 1309, 1319–20 (describing two applications of written description case
law, one consistent with 1967 precedent as priority policing, and one new creation in
1997 with the criticized Lilly opinion).
127
Compare Moba, 325 F.3d at 1323, with Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
375 F.3d at 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
208 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
128
358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), en banc reh’g denied, 375 F.3d 1303.
129
Id. at 917.
130
Compare Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1305 with Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,
323 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and Unocal, 208 F.3d at 1002.
131
See Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1304 (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 1305 (Lourie, J.,
concurring); id. at 1307 (Rader, J., dissenting); id. at 1325 (Linn, J., dissenting); id. at
1327 (Dyk, J., concurring).
132
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc,
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
133
Id. at 1380.
134
Id. at 1380–81 (Linn, J., concurring).
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Ariad’s petition for en banc rehearing on the issue of written
description.135
Analyzing the case law development of the written description
requirement during this period at the Federal Circuit is extremely
difficult. Many contradictory opinions (whether concurring or
dissenting) were written regarding the scope and application of the
written description requirement. Binding precedent established a
separate written description requirement and its scope, but many
judges were beginning to question the wisdom of that precedent.
By this time, the three main camps had settled upon their body of
case law for string quotes and propositions that favored their
positions, while dismissing others away as dicta or not entirely
accurate.136 “The differences of opinion among the judges of the
Federal Circuit, are, in microcosm, the ‘percolation’ that scholars
feared would be lost by a national court at the circuit level.”137
This splintering of the Federal Circuit into three main camps
regarding the role of the written description requirement is
therefore not bad at all. On the contrary, this creative tension
serves to benefit patent law and is precisely the reason the Federal
Circuit has succeeded despite its unique structure in the federal
court system. However, in granting Ariad’s petition for rehearing
en banc, the court seems to have decided that the question of a
separate written description requirement “ha[d] percolated enough”
and was “ripe for en banc resolution.”138
II. THREE MAIN CAMPS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
In researching the written description debate at the Federal
Circuit, three voices stand out time and again: Chief Judge
Rader’s, Judge Lourie’s, and Judge Linn’s. The Federal Circuit is
highly respected for its well rounded and esteemed bench, and
these three are certainly no exception. Indeed, among this group of
135

Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(granting the petition for rehearing en banc).
136
See supra note 131 (highlighting differing opinions among Federal Circuit judges on
the written description requirement).
137
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
138
Id.
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three judges are the current Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit,
three Jefferson Medal Recipients, and two former patent
practitioners.139
A. Judge Lourie: Written Description Has Protected The Quid
Pro Quo Since 1793
Judge Lourie’s position is perhaps the simplest to explain and
is articulated in his majority opinions in Rochester and Enzo.140
His opinions and rationale governed every majority panel of the
Federal Circuit since 1992.141 Essentially, Judge Lourie’s view is
that the written description requirement exists and always has
existed in patent law.142 “The purpose of the ‘written description’
requirement is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make and
use’ the invention; rather, the applicant must also convey with
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing
date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”143 The
written description requirement, according to Judge Lourie, “is
satisfied by the patentee’s disclosure of such descriptive means as
words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set
forth the claimed invention.”144
This construction of the written description requirement does
not conflict with the role of patent claims, according to Judge
Lourie.145 While the claims certainly define the right of the
patentee to exclude others from practicing the invention, it is the
written description that teaches the invention.146 An inventor is
entitled to claims as broad as the invention which he has actually
discovered. Thus, while the claims must be supported by the
139

See Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.
gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=132&Itemid=24 (follow “Richard
Linn, Circuit Judge” hyperlink and “Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge” hyperlink) (last
visited Aug. 27, 2010).
140
Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1305 (Lourie, J., concurring); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. GenProbe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J., concurring).
141
See supra notes 113–24 and accompanying text.
142
Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1305.
143
Enzo, 323 F.3d at 969 (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
144
Id.
145
Id. (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
146
See Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1306 (Lourie, J., concurring).
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written description, the written description contains a lot of extra
material that is not in the claims, but rather, is necessary to teach
the invention and to explain precisely what constitutes the
invention.147
Judge Lourie’s view, and indeed the court’s view, of the
written description requirement is necessarily more demanding
than the views of Chief Judge Rader or Judge Linn. This is so
because in addition to the “enablement” requirement, which Judges
Rader and Linn agree exists, Judge Lourie finds that a patentee
must also meet the demands of a separate “written description”
requirement, also contained in § 112.148 In Judge Lourie’s view,
written description requires that inventors not only explain how to
make and use the invention (i.e., “enable” the invention), but also
explain in sufficient detail to one of skill in the art what it is that
the inventor claims to have invented (i.e., “describe” the invention)
and demonstrate that he had “possession” of the invention at the
time of filing.149
B. Chief Judge Rader: Judge Lourie’s Written Description is
Dead, New Written Description as Priority Policeman
Chief Judge Rader, on the other hand, views written
description quite differently. His view is also best illustrated by
his dissents in Rochester and Enzo. According to Chief Judge
Rader, the written description doctrine that Judge Lourie traces
back to the Patent Act of 1793 was actually superseded by the
introduction of patent claims in the Patent Act of 1836.150 The
only “written description” requirement, according to Chief Judge
Rader, is the new “judge-made doctrine” created in 1967 by Judge
Rich in In re Ruschig.151
This new written description requirement was created only to
prevent a patent applicant from adding new matter to his claims

147

Id.
Id.
149
Id.
150
See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“In later enactments [of the Patent
Act], this notice function was assigned to claims, leaving enablement as the only purpose
of the ‘written description’ language.”).
151
See id. at 977–78 (citing In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
148
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that were not contained in his original application.152 For example,
consider a patent applicant who files a patent in 2001 covering a
process of making freeze-dried instant coffee where concentrated
coffee extract is freeze-dried when it contains solids between 25%
and 60%.153 The patent applicant would not be able to amend his
application in 2002 to include the process of making freeze-dried
coffee where the solid content in the concentrated coffee extract is
“greater than 35%.” Nor is the patent applicant entitled to later
claim the range from 35% to 100% as his invention because he did
not describe his invention as covering that range when he filed his
patent application in 2001.154 Rather, when the inventor first
discovered his invention in 2001, he described his invention as
covering only the range from 25% to 60%. The written description
requirement therefore serves one function: “to ensure that the
inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application
relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him.”155
According to Chief Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit first made
the mistake of applying the written description requirement as a
general disclosure doctrine in place of enablement in the 1997 case
of Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.156 In
Lilly, the patent specification at issue disclosed a general method
of producing human insulin cDNA and contained a description of
rat insulin cDNA, but did not provide a written description of
human insulin cDNA.157 The court held that “[d]escribing a
method of preparing a cDNA or even describing the protein that
the cDNA encodes, as the example [in the specification] does, does
not necessarily describe the cDNA itself.”158 Accordingly, the
court concluded, “a description of rat insulin cDNA is not a
description of the broad classes of vertebrate or mammalian insulin

152

See id. at 978.
This example is loosely based upon the facts of In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257
(C.C.P.A. 1976).
154
Id.
155
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 262).
156
See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 988 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
157
See Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
158
Id.
153
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cDNA,” including human cDNA.159 Chief Judge Rader would
have invalidated the patent for failure to satisfy the enablement
requirement instead, because “the inventor certainly did not show
one of skill in the art how to make human insulin cDNA.”160 By
invalidating the patent on the grounds of failure to satisfy the
written description requirement, the Chief Judge argued, the
Federal Circuit “purported to create a new doctrine for adequacy of
disclosure that it labeled incorrectly ‘written description’ . . .
[which] had never been a free-standing substitute for
enablement.”161
Chief Judge Rader’s position can be summed up by stating that
written description is only properly used as a way to police priority
of invention. It ensures that an inventor does not file a patent
application in Year 1, then later, in Year 3 try to claim his
invention in Year 1 was broader than it really was. In Chief Judge
Rader’s view, the court’s “written description” requirement should
not try to replace the existing enablement requirement, which has
worked just fine.
C. Judge Linn: There is No Written Description
Judge Linn’s position on written description is expressed in
Ariad, Rochester, and Enzo. Judge Linn is of the opinion that there
is no separate written description requirement.162 Section 112
“requires no more of the specification than a disclosure that is
sufficient to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to
make and use the invention.”163
The written description
“requirement” is satisfied by the enablement requirement;
therefore, a separate written description requirement does not
exist.164 In Judge Linn’s view, the claims determine the scope of
the invention and the creation of a separate written description

159

Id. at 1568.
Enzo, 323 F.3d at 980 (Rader, J., dissenting).
161
Id.
162
See Ariad Pharm., Inc., v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Linn, J., concurring), aff’d en banc, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
163
Id.
164
See id. at 1381.
160
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requirement confuses the public as to where they should look to
determine the scope of the patent.165
Judge Linn’s position is, in part, consistent with Chief Judge
Rader’s opinion.166 While both believe that the need for a separate
written description requirement was eliminated with the advent of
patent claims, Judge Linn does not share Chief Judge Rader’s
belief that a new “written description” requirement was created in
1967.167 Thus, Judge Linn believes that once a patent is issued, the
only inquiry into the specification should be for purposes of
determining compliance with the enablement requirement.168
III. ANALYSIS
A. Purpose of Written Description Requirement
The purpose of the written description requirement stems from
the social contract notion of patent law. Before an inventor can
secure the monopoly rights to exclude others from the practice of
his invention, the inventor must make an adequate public
disclosure of that invention.169 This concept is at the heart of our
patent system.170
The written description requirement serves to ensure that, in
exchange for granting a patent, the public gets the full disclosure of
the invention so that it may possess the entire invention when that
patent expires.171 In Merrill v. Yeomans,172 the Court held a patent
invalid for failure to comply with the written description
requirement because the application was “far from possessing that
165

See id.
Compare Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977–78 (Rader, J., dissenting) (asserting that “the only
purpose of the ‘written description’ language” in “later enactments” of the Patent Act is
“enablement”), with Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1380–81 (Linn, J., concurring) (asserting that the
purpose of a “written description of the invention” is enablement).
167
See id. (noting that because claims are the true measure of the scope of a patent, a
written description inquiry confuses the matter); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
168
See Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1380–81.
169
Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876).
170
The patent system was created to satisfy the constitutional instruction “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
171
See id.
172
94 U.S. 568 (1876).
166
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precision and clearness of statement with which one who proposes
to secure a monopoly at the expense of the public ought to describe
the thing which no one but himself can use or enjoy, without
paying him for the privilege of doing so.”173 In further elaborating
on this quid pro quo, the Court stated:
The growth of the patent system in the last quarter
of a century in this country has reached a stage in its
progress where the variety and magnitude of the
interests involved require accuracy, precision, and
care in the preparation of all the papers on which
the patent is founded. . . . The developed and
improved condition of the patent law, and of the
principles which govern the exclusive rights
conferred by it, leave no excuse for ambiguous
language or vague descriptions. The public should
not be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it,
without being clearly told what it is that limits these
rights. The genius of the inventor, constantly
making improvements in existing patents,—a
process which gives to the patent system its greatest
value,—should not be restrained by vague and
indefinite descriptions of claims in existing patents
from the salutary and necessary right of improving
on that which has already been invented. It seems
to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to
the patentee and to the public, than that the former
should understand, and correctly describe, just what
he has invented, and for what he claims a patent.174
This public notice function of the written description
requirement serves “to inform the public during the life of the
patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be
known which features may be safely used or manufactured without
a license and which may not.”175 Thus, while the public can look
to the claim of a patent, a one-sentence declaration of the scope of
the invention, the inventor is only entitled to claims consistent in
173
174
175

Id.
Id. at 573–74.
Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931).
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scope and magnitude with the actual invention.176 The CCPA, in
In re Sus,177 recognized “[t]he public purpose on which the patent
law rests requires the granting of claims commensurate in scope
with the invention disclosed.”178 In other words, “the invention
claimed shall be no broader than the invention set forth in the
written description forming part of the specification.”179
Judge Rich, in Fields v. Conover,180 commented on the policy
grounds of written description.181 The patents at issue in Fields
related to chemical compositions having antibacterial agents.182
The dispute turned on whether Conover’s specification provided
written description support for a specific compound when nowhere
in the 196 pages of his specification was a single compound named
or identified by formula. Judge Rich’s discussion hints at the
problem of a loose written description requirement, namely, that
inventors will overreach, thus deterring legitimate future
innovation:
Here, Conover is concededly first with an extremely
broad discovery, broad claims have already been
allowed, and broad, non-elected claims roughly
corresponding to Formula XXII are pending which,
if allowed, will dominate most, if not all, the scope
of Fields’ claims. If Conover is allowed to copy
Fields’ claims merely because the application is
sufficient to teach how to make and use the subject
matter thereof and points indistinctly and
ambiguously in the general direction of that subject
matter, the socially valuable incentive to further
research and development provided by the
opportunity to obtain subservient patents will be
considerably diminished.183

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

See In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 505 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
306 F.2d 494, 505 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
Id. at 497.
Id.
443 F.2d 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
Id. at 1392.
Id. at 1387.
Id.
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This problem came full circle in Fiers v. Revel,184 a case
involving original claims. In Fiers, the Federal Circuit affirmed a
denial of priority to an earlier-filed application because it did not
provide adequate written description support under § 112.185 The
court, in finding a lack of written description support, found
Revel’s disclosure to represent merely “a wish, or arguably a plan,
for obtaining the DNA.”186 The court explained that a “bare
reference to a DNA with a statement that it can be obtained by
reverse transcription is not a description; it does not indicate that
Revel was in possession of the DNA.”187 Rather, “Revel’s
application does not even demonstrate that the disclosed method
actually leads to the DNA, and thus that he had possession of the
invention, since it only discloses a clone that might be used to
obtain mRNA coding for B-IF.”188
The purpose of the written description requirement under § 112
is, and always has been, to prevent inventors from overreaching
when securing a patent from the public. “[I]t is broader than to
merely explain how to ‘make and use;’ the applicant must also
convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of
the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the
invention,” the invention being “whatever is now claimed.”189
Further, “‘the invention’ is defined by the claims on appeal,”
regardless of whether they are original claims or later-amended
claims.190
The written description requirement limits the inventor to that
which he actually invented and disclosed in his original filing with
the patent office—no more, no less.191 In order for the inventor to
be “entitled” to a particular filing date, he must fully disclose his

184

984 F.2d 1164, 1166, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Id.
186
Id. at 1171.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
190
See id. at 1565.
191
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 135 (1854) (Grier, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 98, 101 for a discussion of “swearing behind” and priority.
185
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invention at the time of filing.192 Whether the inventor attempts to
broaden his claims through amendment,193 to swear behind a § 112
reference by claiming priority to an earlier-filed application,194 or
to defend a broad charge in an interference,195 written description
ensures that the inventor only gets rights to exclude commensurate
in scope with that which he has actually invented.196 This is not to
say the claims do not have a function; certainly they are the outer
bounds of the scope of the patent.197 However, an inventor must
first satisfy the written description requirement before he is entitled
to claims of any breadth.
Chief Judge Rader’s reading of the written description
requirement—i.e., that it only functions to police priority to laterfiled claims—is too constricted.198 Whether an inventor is trying
to swear behind a reference or obtain a patent with claims as
originally filed, the policies of patent law require that he tell the
public what he has invented.199
The written description
requirement, as envisioned by Judge Lourie and consistent with
nearly two hundred years of precedent serves to police priority
even in original applications at the USPTO. In order to establish
entitlement to a particular filing date, the inventor must be able to
describe, among other things, what it is that he has invented. In
other words, he must demonstrate that he is in “possession” of the

192
Id. at 126–27 (Grier, J. dissenting) (holding a patent invalid for lack of written
description when the inventor could not describe the process and did not actually invent
it).
193
See, e.g., In re Lew, 257 Fed. App’x 281, 285 (2007) (stating that an amendment is
not inherent to the original specification for the purposes of § 112 if it would broaden the
scope of the invention beyond the initial disclosure).
194
See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1555.
195
See, e.g., In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
196
See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
197
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“The claim is the measure of [the
patentee’s] right to relief, and while the specification may be referred to[,] to limit the
claim, it can never be made available to expand it.”).
198
See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Rader, J., dissenting).
199
See McClain, 141 U.S. 419 at 423–24 (“Nothing is better settled in the law of
patents than that the patentee may claim the whole or only a part of his invention, and
that if he only describe and claim a part, he is presumed to have abandoned the residue to
the public.” (emphasis added)).
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claimed invention. Written description is the “show me, don’t tell
me” requirement of patent law.
B. Common Misconceptions and Mischaracterizations of the
Written Description Requirement
1. Statutory Construction Supports Three Requirements in §
112, ¶ 1.
Chief Judge Rader suggests in Enzo that a separate written
description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 disregards the clear
mandate of the statute.200 Section 112, ¶ 1 provides:
The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.201
Upon inspection, it is apparent that there are two “, and”s in
this section, effectively dividing this paragraph into three parts:
[Construction 1:]
The specification shall contain a written description
[1] of the invention, and
[2] of the manner and process of making and using
it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same, and
[3] shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.202

200
201
202

Enzo, 323 F.3d at 976 (Rader, J., dissenting).
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006).
Id.
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Some suggest the division above is improper, and that a proper
construction contains only two requirements:
[Construction 2:]
[1] The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and
[2] shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.203
Dividing § 112, ¶ 1 into two sections, however, as in
Construction 2 above, ignores the “, and” in part [1] (emphasized
above). “As a principle of statutory construction, it is presumed
that Congress [does] not use superfluous words.”204 By contrast,
splitting § 112, ¶ 1 into three separate and distinct requirements
makes contextual sense, remains consistent with the plain language
of the statute, and does not require the use of superfluous words.
Indeed, Judge Rich, who was influential in the enactment of the
Patent Act of 1952, declared that the written description language
was “preserved, in writing the Patent Act of 1952, because [it was]
familiar and had many times been construed.”205 Had Congress
intended to remove the separate written description requirement, or
to combine it with the enablement requirement, it could have
removed the clause “and of the manner and process of making,
constructing, using, and compounding the same,”206 but it did
not.207 As Judge Rich stated, Congress intended to preserve the
written description requirement as it was.208
Thus, while Chief Judge Rader chastised the Enzo majority for
disregarding the text of § 112, saying “[i]f it is possible to
characterize disregard of statutory text as a secondary mistake, this
203
204
205
206
207
208

Id. (emphasis added).
In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 591–92 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
Id. at 594 (Rich, J., concurring).
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119.
See Barker, 559 F.2d at 591–92.
Id. at 594 (Rich, J., concurring).
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case fits that classification,”209 his approach is, in fact, less faithful
to the statute.210
2. The Written Description Requirement Survived the
Introduction of Patent Claims.
Chief Judge Rader suggests that the “written description”
requirement originated with the Patent Act of 1793 but was quickly
replaced by claims with the passage of the Patent Act of 1836.211
On this theory, written description was collapsed into enablement
from 1836 until 1967 when Judge Rich “created” a new written
description doctrine to enforce priority.212 However, Chief Judge
Rader has little case support for this proposition and does not
address any of the cases decided between 1836 and 1967 which
viewed written description as separate from enablement.213
In Enzo, Judge Lourie offered perhaps the strongest response to
Chief Judge Rader’s position. While it may be correct that written
description historically served a critical purpose before claims
were required, he argued, the statute was never amended to delete
the written description requirement once claims were
introduced.214 In fact, language similar to today’s “written
description” requirement in § 112, can be traced all the way back
to each and every Patent Act since 1793 and remains “virtually
unchanged.”215 Chief Judge Rader cites Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.216 for the proposition that “[t]he
responsibility for changing settled law rests with Congress. . . .
Fundamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the
legitimate expectations of inventors in their property.”217
209

Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader,
J., dissenting).
210
See Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1327–28 (Bryson, J.,
concurring) (“[I]f the Ruschig line of cases is sound as a matter of statutory construction,
it is difficult to see why that construction does not apply equally in the Lilly non-priority
context.”).
211
See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977 (Rader, J., dissenting).
212
See id. at 977–78.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 971 (Lourie, J., concurring).
215
See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
216
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
217
Enzo, 323 F.3d at 982 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)).
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However, in reading the written description requirement out of §
112, Chief Judge Rader was himself ignoring the intent of
Congress and inviting the concomitant risks. Moreover, as the
Supreme Court has explained, “repeals by implication are not
favored. . . . [T]he intention of [Congress] to repeal must be clear
and manifest.”218 Thus, if Congress intended to repeal the written
description requirement, it is reasonable to assume it would have
excised it from the statute itself.
Further, cases immediately following the creation of claims
continued to rely on the written description requirement to
invalidate patents. In fact, Chief Judge Rader’s assertion that
written description, as known pre-1836, disappeared until a new
version resurfaced in 1967 completely ignores 131 years of
precedent.219 The construction of § 112 that requires portions of it
to apply only to police priority while other portions, within the
same sentence, to apply at all times is simply untenable.
3. Judge Rich did not “Reinvent” Written Description with In
re Ruschig
Chief Judge Rader continues to express his view that Judge
Rich created a new “judge-made doctrine” of written description in

218

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189–90 (1978) (quoting Posadas v. Nat’l
City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
219
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 312 (1980) (discussing how the
Plant Patent Act of 1930 was enacted in part to overcome an obstacle to plant patents
regarding their ability to satisfy the written description requirement); Schriber-Schroth v.
Cleveland Trust, 305 U.S. 47, 61 (1938) (invalidating patent to “laterally flexible web” in
piston design for an internal combustion engine for lack of written description support);
R.R. Co. v. Mellon, 104 U.S. 112, 117–18 (1881) (observing that the Patent Act of 1836
has a written description requirement to make a patent valid as well as an enablement
requirement); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1876) (invalidating
infringement claim to deodorized heavy oils for lack of written description); O’Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120–21 (1854) (invalidating a claim of Samuel Morse for
failure to satisfy the written description requirement); Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (denying priority to inventor in interference when parent application did
not satisfy written description requirement despite providing an enabling disclosure); In
re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (stating that “two of the several”
requirements of § 112 include enablement and best mode which implies that something
else must remain); In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 495–96 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (invalidating patent
claims for being “unduly broad,” or beyond the scope of the invention described in the
“written description”); In re Moore, 155 F.2d 379, 382 (C.C.P.A. 1946) (invalidating
claims for being broader than written description).

C03_SCHROEDER_010411_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

98

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

1/4/2011 6:08 PM

[Vol. 21:63

1967 in In re Ruschig.220 In making this broad pronouncement,
Chief Judge Rader overlooks many of the earlier decisions
applying the written description requirement between 1836 and
1967 from both the Supreme Court and the CCPA.221 In Chief
Judge Rader’s defense, he has clearly pinpointed one function and
application of the written description requirement—namely, that of
preventing inventors from writing a broad specification, then later,
in response to an interference or to swear behind a reference,
attempting to claim something broader than originally invented.
Chief Judge Rader cannot, however, point to any support for the
proposition that the written description requirement under § 112 is
only to be applied in those limited situations. As Judge Bryson
pointed out in his concurrence in Moba, “[t]here is no language in
section 112 that would support such a restriction.”222
For example, consider In re DiLeone.223 The sole issue in this
case was “whether the specification satisfie[d] the [written]
description requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §
112.”224 The panel, including Judge Rich, reiterated that the
written description requirement is separate and distinct from
enablement.225 In fact, the court recognized that the written
description requirement need not rise and fall with the enablement
requirement.226 The court certainly did not say, “this only applies
to police priority.” Although the court “note[d] that the expression
in question appeared in the originally filed claims,” the court did
not rely solely on that fact to resolve the matter.227 Rather, the
CCPA performed the requisite fact-based analysis and determined
220

See Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1311 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Judge Rich, the first judge
to use the description requirement to police priority . . . .”); Moba B.V. v. Diamond
Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“[CCPA]
inaugurated use of § 112 to prevent the addition of new matter to claims.”); Id. at 1323–
24 (Rader, J., concurring) (“In In re Ruschig, this court’s predecessor court created a new
written description requirement for the sole purpose of enforcing priority issues.”); Enzo,
323 F.3d at 977–78 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[CCPA] created for the first time a new WD
doctrine to enforce priority.”).
221
See Federal Circuit Act of 1982, supra note 90.
222
Moba, 325 F.3d at 1327 (Bryson, J., concurring).
223
436 F.2d 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
224
Id. at 1405.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 1406.
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the specification was at least as broad as the applicant’s broadest
claims.228 If Chief Judge Rader’s view of the law is correct, the
court would have simply stopped once it realized the expression in
question was in the originally filed claims.
Similarly, in In re Moore,229 the CCPA, analyzing § 112,
explained that the first inquiry is to determine if the claims “set out
and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of
precision and particularity.”230 If they do, then the court turns to
the many requirements of § 112, ¶ 1.231 One of these is
“determining whether the subject matter defined in the claims is
described in the specification.”232 This “written description”
requirement is “relatively simple to comply with and thus will
ordinarily demand minimal concern on the part of the Patent
Office.”233 Again, as in In re DiLeone, the court nowhere states
that the written description requirement is only relevant when
dealing with issues of priority. In this case, it is unclear whether
the claims were as originally filed, however, they were
“consistently rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112” which suggests they
were rejected from the very beginning of prosecution before the
USPTO.234
Likewise, in In re Sus, the court actually did reject claims, as
originally filed, which were broader than the invention set forth in
the written description.235 In so doing, the court explained that the
purpose embodied in the written description requirement is that an
“invention claimed shall be no broader than the invention set forth
in the written description forming part of the specification.”236 The
court analyzed the appealed claims and found that they “fail[ed] to
meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 in that they [were]
broader than the invention described in the written description

228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236

See id. at 1405–06.
In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1234.
In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 497 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
Id.
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thereof as set forth in the specification.”237 Further, “one skilled in
this art would not be taught by these examples that all ‘aryl and
substituted aryl radicals’ were properly within the subject matter
which appellants consider to be their invention.”238 Although In re
Sus may have been initially decided under §112, ¶ 2, Judge Rich
himself noted it was more properly considered under the first
paragraph.239 Tellingly, the only other portion of § 112 quoted by
the court in In re Sus is the precise language of the written
description requirement: “The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention.”240
In summary, Chief Judge Rader’s assertion that Judge Rich
resurrected a new written description requirement in 1967 for the
sole purpose of policing priority finds no support in 131 years of
precedent where the Supreme Court continued to apply the written
description requirement after claims were added to patents.241
Most interestingly, it was not even supported by Judge Rich in In
re Sus, five years prior to his alleged creation of the doctrine.242
Even in Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, Judge Rich stated only that
“the ‘written description’ requirement most often comes into play
where claims not presented in the application when filed are
presented thereafter;” he does not say it “only” comes into play in
those situations.243 Finally, Chief Judge Rader’s position lacks
support in the decisions of the CCPA immediately following the
creation of this “new” written description doctrine.244
4. The CCPA and the Federal Circuit have Applied the
Written Description Requirement to Original Claims
Chief Judge Rader, in Enzo, maintained that “[a]t no time did
either the CCPA or the Federal Circuit purport to apply the

237

Id.
Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
239
See In re Robins, 429 F.2d 455, 457 n.8 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
240
Sus, 306 F.2d at 494 n.1 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)).
241
See supra note 220.
242
See Sus, 306 F.2d at 497.
243
935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
244
See, e.g., In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Wertheim, 541
F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 592 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
238
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equivalent new matter/written description rejections to original
claims or other claims without priority problems.”245
First, simply because the CCPA or the Federal Circuit has not
had the opportunity to apply a § 112 written description rejection
to originally filed claims does not mean that § 112 written
description has no application to originally filed claims. Courts
“decide cases as they come to [them], based on the arguments
raised, the decisions below, the law, the facts, and [their] best
efforts,”246 so just because neither the CCPA nor the Federal
Circuit was presented with the opportunity to strike down original
claims under § 112 written description does not mean § 112
written description does not apply to original claims. Instead, at
worst, it means the issue is undecided and at best, it means § 112
would apply to original claims as it would any other claim.247
Further, as stated above, the CCPA’s appellate jurisdiction over
patent cases was far more limited than the current jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit.248 It is therefore entirely plausible that the
Federal Circuit would face a situation calling for an application of
an established doctrine at the CCPA to a new factual scenario.
Second, the CCPA has indeed applied the written description
doctrine to originally filed claims in In re Sus and In re DiLeone,
and the Federal Circuit applied written description to originally
filed claims in Fiers.249 That the court did not have more
opportunities before it to issue rejections under § 112 written
description is both irrelevant and consistent with the CCPA’s
limited jurisdiction of patent cases, hearing such cases only on
appeal from the USPTO.250 Moreover, at that time in the court’s

245

Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 974.
247
See id. at 971–72 (Lourie, J., concurring) (“As for the lack of earlier cases on this
issue, it regularly happens in adjudication that issues do not arise until counsel raise them,
and, when that occurs, courts are then required to decide them.”).
248
See supra notes 90, 93 and accompanying text.
249
See In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494,
497 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see also Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(“Revel thus urges that only similar language in the specification or original claims is
necessary to satisfy the written description requirement. We disagree.”).
250
See, e.g., In re Steinhauer, 410 F.2d 411, 412 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
246
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history, the USPTO was particularly imprecise in issuing rejections
under 35 U.S.C. § 112.251
The bottom line is that the Federal Circuit and the CCPA do
not need to continuously apply the written description requirement
to the fullest extent possible in order to prevent the written
description requirement from becoming extinct. The written
description requirement has been a part of the Patent Act since
1793, the Supreme Court has affirmed and reaffirmed its existence,
and the doctrine still exists today.
5. The Holding in In re Gardner Has Been Misunderstood.
Chief Judge Rader cited cases such as In re Gardner, for the
proposition that status as an original claim is all that is necessary to
satisfy the written description requirement for § 112.252 In
Gardner, the court actually stated that “[c]laim 2, which apparently
was an original claim, in itself constituted a description in the
original disclosure equivalent in scope and identical in language to
the total subject matter now being claimed.”253 Because the written
description requirement is a fact-based inquiry which must be
made in each case, this quote from Gardner should not be
misconstrued as stating that every original claim automatically
satisfies the written description requirement of § 112. Rather, in
this case, claim 2 covered a total of seventeen compounds and
delineated a subgenus.254 The USPTO’s § 112 rejection was based
on the fact that only three out of the five possible R(1) substituents
were specifically exemplified in the specification and no language
was found in the specification corresponding to the subgenus.255
Effectively, the CCPA was saying that the level of detail necessary
to satisfy the written description requirement was present in the
251

See, e.g., In re Robins, 429 F.2d 455, 456 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“Our consideration
of this appeal would have been immeasurably simplified had the examiner merely
referred to the specific language in § 112, or at least to the paragraph in which it is to be
found.”); In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“We have set forth the Patent
Office position in some detail as we feel that it confuses, and in fact is in part contrary to,
two of the several requirements of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.”).
252
See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 979 (citing In re Gardner, 475 F.2d 1389, 1391 (C.C.P.A.
1973)).
253
Gardner, 475 F.2d at 1391.
254
Id.
255
Id.
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claims as filed, which themselves constitute part of the
specification.256 Furthermore, the court found sufficient evidence
of enablement in the specification as well.257 This decision
prevents the USPTO from issuing a hyper-technical rejection
whereby a claim is rejected for lack of written description simply
because the language of the claim was not copied, in ipsis verbis,
into the specification before filing.
The CCPA’s position in Gardner is consistent with Judge
Lourie’s majority opinion in Enzo.258 Enzo argued that the written
description requirement was met as a matter of law because the
claim language appeared in ipsis verbis in the specification.259 The
court disagreed, finding that “[t]he appearance of mere indistinct
words in a specification or a claim, even an original claim, does
not necessarily satisfy [the written description] requirement.”260 In
both Enzo and Lilly, the court was “faced with a set of facts in
which the words of the claim alone did not convey an adequate
description of the invention.”261 In those situations, “regardless
whether the claim appears in the original specification and is thus
supported by the specification as of the filing date, § 112 ¶ 1 is not
necessarily met.”262 “If a purported description of an invention
does not meet the requirements of the statute, the fact that it
appears as an original claim or in the specification does not save it.
A claim does not become more descriptive by its repetition, or its
longevity.”263
6. The Claims Still Define the Invention
Judge Linn is skeptical of the separate written description
requirement because “the claims—not the specification—define
the invention.”264 However, for an inventor to be entitled to patent
256

See id.
See id. at 1392.
258
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
259
Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
260
See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 968.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id. at 968–69.
264
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d en
banc, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
257
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claims of any scope, he must first satisfy the written description
requirement.265 “Interpretation of written description as this court
has done furthers the goal of the law to have claims commensurate
in scope with what has been disclosed to the public.”266 The
claims serve as the absolute outer bounds of the scope of the
invention. As part of the quid pro quo of the patent system, in
exchange for the patent, the inventor must describe his particular
invention commensurate with the scope he has claimed.267
7. A Specification May Enable One of Skill in the Art to
Make and Use an Invention Without Providing Adequate
Written Description
While it has been suggested that the distinction between the
written description requirement and enablement requirement may
not make a difference in some cases, there are a few situations
where the specification at issue was found to satisfy the
enablement requirement but not to satisfy the written description
requirement.268
For example, in Fields v. Conover, Judge Rich explicitly stated
that “a specification may provide adequate teachings of how to
make and use subject matter which is subsequently claimed and yet
fail to contain a written description thereof which complies with
the first requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.”269
Fields involved an interference between two parties on
“substituted 4,10-dioxo-5-hydroxy-1,2,3,4,4a,9,9a,10-octahydro[-]
anthracenes.”270 The only issue on appeal was whether the
265

See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
Enzo, 323 F.3d at 972 (Lourie, J., concurring).
267
See In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 497 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“The public purpose on which the
patent law rests requires the granting of claims commensurate in scope with the invention
disclosed . . . the invention claimed shall be no broader than the invention set forth in the
written description forming part of the specification.”).
268
See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 974 (“Perhaps there is little difference in electrical and
mechanical inventions between describing an invention and enabling one to make and use
it, but that is not true of chemical and chemical-like inventions.”). In fact, Judge
Newman once conflated the two in Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 835 F.2d
1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The purpose of the description requirement is to state what
is needed to fulfill the enablement criteria.”).
269
Fields v. Conover, 443 F.2d 1386, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (citing In re Ahlbrecht, 435
F.2d 908, 911 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
270
Id. at 1386.
266
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disclosure of the Conover application satisfied the written
description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.271
The court found the enablement requirement was satisfied; one of
ordinary skill in the art would be enabled, without undue
experimentation, to make and use the claimed substance.272 While
the Conover application provides some “suggestions or guidance”
to support the claim, this was not enough to satisfy the written
description requirement.273
The suggestions and guidance
provided in the application fell far short of the “full, clear, concise,
and exact” written description requirement.274 Similar cases have
also noted that compliance with enablement does not necessarily
satisfy the written description requirement.275
C. Common Ground
The judges of the Federal Circuit have varying viewpoints on
the legitimacy of a written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. §
112. Nevertheless, some common threads run through the
opinions of the CCPA and the Federal Circuit notwithstanding the
debate over the scope, or even the existence, of the written
description requirement. For instance, all appear to agree on a few
key concepts: 1) the inventor is not entitled to a patent broader than
his true contribution to society in the form of his invention; 2)
whether the patent is broader than the disclosed invention is a factbased inquiry requiring a case-by-case assessment; 3) in the vast
majority of cases, “enablement” and “written description” will rise
and fall together. To sidestep the written description debate, this
Section will refer generally to the “disclosure requirements of §
112.”
1. An Inventor Is Entitled to a Patent Commensurate in Scope
with His Contribution to Society.
The disclosure requirements of § 112 satisfy the policy premise
of the law “whereby the inventor’s technical/scientific advance is
271

Id. at 1390.
Id. at 1391.
273
See id. at 1392 (quoting Biel v. Chessin, 347 F.2d 898, 905 (C.C.P.A. 1965)).
274
Fields, 443 F.2d at 1392 (quoting Ahlbrecht, 435 F.2d at 911).
275
See, e.g., Albrecht, 435 F.2d at 911 (finding that a patent application for a chemical
compound lacked a description “in full, clear, concise, and exact terms”).
272
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added to the body of knowledge, as consideration for the grant of
patent exclusivity.”276 The purpose of the disclosure requirements
of § 112 is “to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set
forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s
contribution to the field of art as described in the patent
specification.”277 The measure of the inventor’s contribution, for
purposes of compliance with the disclosure requirements of § 112,
is determined by what the patent teaches one of ordinary skill in
the art.278 Hence, Judge Schall noted:
If a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood the inventor to have been in possession
of the claimed invention at the time of filing, even if
every nuance of the claims is not explicitly
described in the specification, then the adequate
written description requirement is met.279
While the judges’ opinions differ as to what is encompassed
within the disclosure requirements of § 112, and the appropriate
grounds for rejection when those requirements are not met, it is
well settled that “claims in an application which are broader than
the applicant’s disclosure are not allowable.”280 Thus, the debate
arises over what to call a rejection of this type and what portion of
§ 112 provides the standard.
2. Whether a Patent Exceeds the Scope of the Inventor’s
Contribution to Society Is a Fact-Based Question Requiring
Case-by-Case Assessment
In determining compliance with the disclosure requirements of
§ 112, “the primary consideration is factual and depends on the
nature of the invention and the amount of knowledge imparted to
those skilled in the art by the disclosure.”281 This inquiry will
“necessarily vary depending on the nature of the invention
276

Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
278
See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Vaeck, 947
F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
279
In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
280
In re Moore, 155 F.2d 379, 382 (C.C.P.A. 1946).
281
Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(quoting In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
277
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claimed.”282 “Broadly articulated rules are peculiarly inappropriate
in this area” and an analysis of each case on its facts must be
made.283 Application of this doctrine will vary based on the
relevant knowledge already in existence regarding the nature and
scope of the invention.284 Thus, “[a]s each field evolves, the
balance also evolves between what is known and what is added by
each inventive contribution.”285
3. Most of the Times a Patent Fails to Satisfy the Enablement
Requirement it Will Also Fail to Satisfy Judge Lourie’s
Written Description Requirement
Judge Bryson, writing for the court in LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth
Resource Mapping, Inc., noted that the written description and
enablement requirements “usually rise and fall together.”286 That
is, “recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full
breadth of the claim is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the
inventor possesses the full scope of the invention, and vice
versa.”287 Even Judge Lourie, perhaps the strongest proponent of a
separate written description requirement among the disclosure
requirements in § 112, agrees that in many situations drawing a
distinction between written description and enablement is
unnecessary.288 It should come as no surprise, then, that in Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., Lilly also appealed the
district court’s finding that the patent was enabled.289 Further,

282

Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
283
Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 263.
284
Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
285
Id. at 1358.
286
LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
But see In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (noting earlier cases
recognizing that the written description requirement might not be met even when the
patent claim satisfies the enabling requirement).
287
LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345.
288
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Perhaps
there is little difference in electrical and mechanical inventions between describing an
invention and enabling one to make and use it, but that is not true of chemical and
chemical-like inventions.”).
289
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d en
banc, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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Judge Linn, in concurrence, suggested that enablement likely was
not satisfied.290
In summary, most agree that if a separate written description
requirement is not recognized, the majority of cases will turn out
the same.291 In the cases where the written description requirement
would have invalidated a patent, the patent will likely be invalid
for failure to satisfy the enablement requirement.292 It appears the
fight is really over those few instances where the specification
would enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the
invention, yet the specification does not describe the invention in
such a manner as to assure one of ordinary skill in the art that the
inventor actually invented what he claimed.
CONCLUSION
The written description requirement traces its origin at least as
far back as 1790 and has been consistently applied over the years
to protect the public from overreaching inventors who claim to
have invented what they have not. It is a doctrine which, like best
mode and enablement, serves to later invalidate a patent when the
inventor is disingenuous or insufficiently forthcoming to the public
to secure the exclusive right to exclude. While certain judges on
the Federal Circuit maintain diverging views of the written
description requirement, they all agree on a few foundational
aspects of the United States patent system. These aspects are
embodied within the written description requirement as envisioned
by a majority of Federal Circuit and CCPA judges and have been
reaffirmed over the ages by the Supreme Court. In reaffirming the
existence of an independent written description requirement, the
Federal Circuit heeded binding Supreme Court precedent and the
foundations upon which our Nation’s patent system rests.
Our patent system rewards inventors, not those who merely
come up with a research plan or a wish. An inventor is entitled to
the right to exclude only over that which he has actually invented.
290

See id. at 1381 (“It may be, as Lilly argues, that such a claim can never be valid,
since the specification cannot enable unknown methods.”).
291
See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.
292
See supra Part III.A.
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This ensures that future inventors are not dissuaded from
improving existing inventions. The public is better served by a
requirement that patent applications “possess[] that precision and
clearness of statement with which one who proposes to secure a
monopoly at the expense of the public ought to describe the thing
which no one but himself can use or enjoy, without paying him for
the privilege of doing so.”293 This requirement is the written
description requirement contained within 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1,
consistent with Judge Lourie’s expression of the written
description requirement, and that reaffirmed by him in the court’s
en banc resolution of Ariad.

293

Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876).

